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A MEANINGFUL FLOOR FOR  
“MEANINGFUL HUMAN CONTROL” 
Rebecca Crootof * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
To the extent there is any consensus among States, ban advocates, and ban 
skeptics regarding the regulation of autonomous weapon systems (AWS),  it is 
grounded in the idea that all weaponry should be subject to ―meaningful human 
control.‖  This ―intuitively appealing‖ principle is immensely popular,  and 
numerous States have explicitly declared their support for it or questioned the 
lawfulness of weapons that operate without such control.  Lack of opposition has 
 
* Executive Director, Yale Information Society Project; Research Scholar and Lecturer in Law, 
Yale Law School. Thanks to Duncan Hollis and the other organizers of Autonomous Legal 
Reasoning? Legal and Ethical Issues in the Technologies of Conflict for the opportunity to 
explore this issue; thanks to Kenneth Anderson and other symposium participants for helpful 
commentary on earlier drafts. 
1. An autonomous weapon system is ―a weapon system that, based on conclusions derived 
from gathered information and preprogrammed constraints, is capable of independently selecting 
and engaging targets.‖ Rebecca Crootof, The Killer Robots Are Here: Legal and Policy 
Implications, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1837 (2015); see U.S. DEP‘T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE NO. 
3000.09: AUTONOMY IN WEAPON SYSTEMS 13–14 (2012); INT‘L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED 
CONFLICTS 44 (2015), https://www.icrc.org/en/document/international-humanitarian-law-and-
challenges-contemporary-armed-conflicts [hereinafter ICRC REPORT] (―‗[A]utonomous weapon 
systems‘ is an umbrella term that would encompass any type of weapon systems, whether 
operating in the air, on land or at sea, with autonomy in its ‗critical functions,‘ meaning a weapon 
that can select . . . and attack . . . targets without human intervention.‖). 
2. Michael Biontino (Chairperson of the Informal Meeting of Experts), Report of the 2015 
Informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS), UN OFF. GENEVA 
(2015) at 11, http://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/ccw/2015/Draft 
Report.pdf [hereinafter Biontino Report] (―There seems to be a widespread understanding that 
both the legal and ethical acceptability of a weapon system would require some kind of human 
control.‖). 
3. U.N. INST. FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH, THE WEAPONIZATION OF INCREASINGLY 
AUTONOMOUS TECHNOLOGIES: CONSIDERING HOW MEANINGFUL HUMAN CONTROL MIGHT 
MOVE THE DISCUSSION FORWARD 2 (2015) [hereinafter UNIDIR REPORT]. 
4. See, e.g., CAMPAIGN TO STOP KILLER ROBOTS, COUNTRY POLICY POSITIONS (2015), 
http://www.stopkillerrobots.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/KRC_CCWexperts_Countries_25 
Mar2015.pdf (compiling statements from States regarding meaningful human control). As this 
paper was being finalized for publication, the 2016 CCW Meeting of Experts on Lethal 
Autonomous Weapon Systems was concluding. As in past years, States voiced support for 
maintaining meaningful human control over weapons; and, as in past years, what that entailed 
remained contested. Chris Ford & Chris Jenks, The International Discussion Continues: 2016 
CCW Experts Meeting on Lethal Autonomous Weapons, JUST SEC. (Apr. 20, 2016), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/30682/2016-ccw-experts-meeting-laws/; Kelley Sayler, More of the 
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led some to conclude that it is either a newly developed customary norm or a pre-
existing, recently exposed rule of customary international law, already binding on 
all States.  
But this broad support comes at a familiar legislative cost; there is no 
consensus as to what ―meaningful human control‖ actually requires. State X might 
define meaningful human control to require informed human approval of each 
possible action of a given weapon system (maintaining a human being ―in the 
loop‖);  State Y might understand it as the ability of a human operator to oversee 
and veto a weapon system‘s actions (having a human being ―on the loop‖); and 
State Z might view the original programming alone as providing sufficiently 
meaningful human control (allowing human beings to be ―off the loop‖).  As the 
Czech Republic noted, in voicing its belief that ―the decision to end somebody‘s 
life must remain under meaningful human control, . . . [t]he challenging part is to 
establish what precisely ‗meaningful human control‘ would entail.‖  
This paper describes attempts to clarify what factors are relevant to 
meaningful human control, discusses benefits associated with retaining 
imprecision in a standard intended to regulate new technology through 
international consensus, and argues that the standard‘s vagueness should be limited 
 
Same: The UN Debate on Lethal Robots, CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF THE DRONE (Apr. 27, 2016), 
http://dronecenter.bard.edu/more-of-the-same-the-un-debate-on-lethal-robots/. 
5. Peter Asaro, Jus Nascendi, Robotic Weapons and the Martens Clause, in ROBOT LAW 
(Ryan Calo, Michael Froomkin & Ian Kerr eds.) (forthcoming 2016) (on file with author) 
(―[T]here is already an emerging norm concerning meaningful human control over the targeting 
of weapons and the use of violent force . . . .‖); see also Michael C. Horowitz & Paul Scharre, 
Meaningful Human Control in Weapon Systems: A Primer 7 (Ctr. for New Am. Sec., Working 
Paper No. 031315, 2015), http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/Ethical_Auton 
omy_Working_Paper_031315.pdf (describing two main schools of thought regarding the 
principle‘s legal status). 
6. This understanding is favored by pro-ban advocates as it essentially permits only the 
development and use of semi-autonomous weapon systems. See Thomas Nash, Director, Article 
36, Remarks to the CCW on Autonomous Weapons Systems (May 15, 2014), 
http://www.article36.org/statements/701/ (―[M]eaningful human control . . . can be seen to 
require deliberative moral reasoning, by human beings, over individual attacks. Weapons that do 
not allow such human control and attacks without such human control should be prohibited.‖); 
Kelsey D. Atherton, The International Community is About to Debate Killer Robots, POPULAR 
SCI. (Apr. 11, 2016), http://www.popsci.com/international-community-is-about-to-debate-killer-
robots (quoting Mark Guburd: ―‗If a (non-human) system makes a decision under internal 
programming plus environmental inputs, that is not human control. . . . You may have 
programmed it, and you may be satisfied that it is making the right decisions, but you are not 
controlling it when it makes those decisions. . . . The whole point of calling something 
autonomous is that it is operating outside of human control, making decisions on its own.‘‖). 
7. See Charli Carpenter, Dynamics of Debate at the Experts Meeting on Autonomous 
Weapons, DUCK OF MINERVA (May 15, 2014), http://duckofminerva.com/2014/05/dynamics-of-
debate-at-the-experts-meeting-on-autonomous-weapons.html (―A U.S. delegate implied yesterday 
that autonomous weapons would of course be controlled by humans because as the creators of 
these weapons we are responsible for their programming.‖). 
8. Statement of the Czech Republic, CCW Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous 
Weapons Systems, Geneva, April 1317, 2015, http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(http 
Assets)/2DD5110A33C9C2D2C1257E26005DD47B/$file/2015_LAWS_MX_Czech+Republic.p
df. 
  
by an interpretive floor. ―Meaningful human control‖ as a regulatory concept can 
usefully augment existing humanitarian norms governing targeting—namely, that 
all attacks meet the treaty and customary international law requirements of 
distinction, proportionality, and feasible precautions.  However, it should not be 
interpreted to conflict with these norms nor be prioritized in a way that undermines 
existing humanitarian protections. 
II. INHERENT IMPRECISION 
The phrase ―meaningful human control‖ was first influentially used in a 
briefing paper to the 2014 Experts Meeting on Lethal Autonomous Weapon 
Systems.  The paper raised important questions that still warrant discussion: what 
type of human control should be exercised over autonomous weapon systems? At 
what point is that control no longer meaningful? To what extent can computer 
programming augment or even constitute human control?  
In part because it is so difficult to pin down precisely what is uniquely 
concerning about AWS —especially given that so many automatic, semi-
autonomous, and even quietly autonomous weapons are in use today —this phrase 
quickly captured the collective imagination.  Pro-ban advocates have even begun 
to define AWS as those that operate ―without‖ or ―beyond‖ meaningful human 
control.  But there are nearly as many understandings of what meaningful human 
 
9. Cf. Michael N. Schmitt, Military Necessity and Humanity in International Humanitarian 
Law: Preserving the Delicate Balance, 50 VIR. J. INT‘L L. 795 (2010) (discussing these 
requirements and arguing that there is no need to consider an independent ―military necessity‖ or 
―humanity‖ requirement, as both are implicitly considered and balanced in the other 
requirements).  
10. Key Areas for Debate on Autonomous Weapon Systems, ARTICLE 36 (May 2014), 
http://www.article36.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/A36-CCW-May-2014.pdf. 
11. Id. at 2. 
12. See generally Michael C. Horowitz, The Ethics & Morality of Robotic Warfare: 
Assessing the Debate Over Autonomous Weapons, 145 J. OF AM. ACAD. OF ARTS & SCI. 25 (Fall 
2016). 
13. See Crootof, supra note 1, at 1863–72 (describing various autonomous weapons 
systems in use today); see also Autonomous Weapons: Decisions to Kill and Destroy Are A 
Human Responsibility, INT‘L COMM. RED CROSS (Apr. 2016), https://www.icrc.org/en/document 
/statement-icrc-lethal-autonomous-weapons-systems [hereinafter ICRC Statement] (―Some 
weapon systems in use today can select and attack targets without human intervention.‖). 
14. See, e.g., ICRC Statement, supra note 13 (―Whether for legal, ethical or military-
operational reasons, there is broad agreement on the need for human control over weapons and 
the use of force.‖). 
15. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & INT‘L HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC, HARVARD LAW SCH., 
MIND THE GAP: THE LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY FOR KILLER ROBOTS 1 (2015), 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/arms0415_ForUpload_0.pdf [hereinafter MIND 
THE GAP] (―Fully autonomous weapons, also known as ‗killer robots,‘ raise serious moral and 
legal concerns because they would possess the ability to select and engage their targets without 
meaningful human control.‖); The United Kingdom and Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems, 
ARTICLE 36, at 1 (2016), http://www.article36.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/UK-and-
LAWS.pdf (―The defining feature of lethal autonomous weapons systems is that they would be 
systems that operate without meaningful human control.‖). 
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control entails as there are writers on the subject.  
Certainly, there are identifiable situations at the far poles of the spectrum. 
When a well-trained and informed person monitors and approves every action 
taken by a weapon system, there is little doubt that she is exercising meaningful 
human control. When a poorly trained, uninformed person ―robotically‖ pushes a 
button every time a red light goes on, she is merely a human rubber stamp—and 
likely a legal and moral scapegoat.  
But the grey area is wide, and full of complicated situations. For example, the 
speed of cyber actions makes automatic and even autonomous cyber defenses 
increasingly desirable.  As a result, ―in offensive cyberwarfare, [autonomous 
weapon systems] may have to be deployed, because they will be integral to 
effective action in an environment populated by automated defenses and taking 
place at speeds beyond human capacities.‖  In both cyber defense and offense, 
requiring in-time human approval for every action would be a dangerous 
impediment. What should the standard for meaningful human control be in 
cyberspace? And should it differ from the standard governing weaponry in other 
realms? 
There is a growing scholarly literature attempting to clarify what factors are 
relevant to establishing meaningful human control.  In early 2014, the 
International Committee for Robot Arms Control (ICRAC) proffered three 
―minimum necessary conditions for meaningful [human] control‖ : 
 
16. See ICRC Statement, supra note 13 (noting the need for clarity about what ―kind and 
degree of human control‖ should be exercised, ideally in a way that satisfies legal, ethical, and 
military-operational concerns). 
17. Meaningful Human Control, Artificial Intelligence and Autonomous Weapons, ARTICLE 
36 (2016), http://www.article36.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/MHC-AI-and-AWS-FINAL.pdf 
[hereinafter Article 36, MHC] (―At its most basic level, the requirement for MHC develops from 
two premises: (1) That a machine applying force and operating without any human control 
whatsoever is broadly considered unacceptable. (2) That a human simply pressing a ‗fire‘ button 
in response to indications from a computer, without cognitive clarity or awareness, is not 
sufficient to be considered ‗human control‘ in a substantive sense.‖). cf. Jeffrey S. Thurnher, No 
One at the Controls: Legal Implications of Fully Autonomous Targeting, 67 JOINT FORCE Q., 4th 
Quarter at 77, 83 (2012) (noting that oversight would not be effective if the human operator were 
merely just a rubber stamp to approve an engagement); M.C. Elish, Moral Crumple Zones: 
Cautionary Tales in Human-Robot Interaction (Mar. 20, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
author) (discussing how individuals may become ―moral crumple zones‖ in accidents involving 
human/algorithmic interactions). 
18. See Eric Messinger, Is It Possible to Ban Autonomous Weapons in Cyberwar?, JUST 
SEC. (Jan. 15, 2015), https://www.justsecurity.org/19119/ban-autonomous-weapons-cyberwar/ 
(―The nature of the battlefield in question and the character of cyber defense will dictate the 
capabilities necessary for effective offensive operations, and the trend will be toward autonomous 
systems.‖). 
19. Id. 
20. See, e.g., Key Elements of Meaningful Human Control, ARTICLE 36 (2016), 
http://www.article36.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/MHC-2016-FINAL.pdf [hereinafter 
Article 36, Key Elements]; Article 36, MHC, supra note 17. 
21. Frank Sauer, ICRAC Statement on Technical Issues to the 2014 UN CCW Expert 
Meeting, ICRAC INT‘L COMM. FOR ROBOT ARMS CONTROL (May 14, 2014), icrac.net/2014/05/
icrac-statement-on-technical-issues-to-the-un-ccw-expert-meeting [hereinafter ICRAC 
Statement]. 
  
1. ―[A] human commander (or operator) must have full contextual and 
situational awareness of the target area and be able to perceive and 
react to any change or unanticipated situations that may have arisen 
since planning the attack‖; 
2. ―[T]here must be active cognitive participation in the attack and 
sufficient time for deliberation on the nature of the target, its 
significance in terms of the necessity and appropriateness of attack, 
and likely incidental and possible accidental effects of the attack‖; 
and 
3. ―[T]here must be a means for the rapid suspension or abortion of the 
attack.‖  
Soon after, the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) reviewed the existing 
literature and concluded that there are three ―essential components‖ to meaningful 
human control: 
1. Human operators are making informed, conscious decisions about 
the use of weapons. 
2. Human operators have sufficient information to ensure the 
lawfulness of the action they are taking, given what they know about 
the target, the weapon, and the context for action. 
3. The weapon is designed and tested, and human operators are 
properly trained, to ensure effective control over the use of the 
weapon.  
More recently, Article 36 has argued that ―meaningful human control‖ requires  
1. ―[p]redictable, reliable and transparent technology‖;  
2. ―[a]ccurate information for the user on the outcome sought, the technology, 
and the context of use‖;  
3. ―[t]imely human judgement and action, and a potential for timely 
intervention‖; and  
4. ―[a]ccountability to a certain standard.‖   
The International Committee of the Red Cross, meanwhile, has stated that 
―meaningful human control‖ entails ―strict operational constraints with respect to 
the task carried out, the targets attacked, the operational environment, the 
geographical space and time of operation, the scope to enable human oversight of 
the weapon system, and the human ability to deactivate it if need be.‖  
Drilling down on the relevant factors shifts the terms of the debate in a 
productive way—but it does not eliminate the principle‘s inherent imprecision. 
With regard to the CNAS definition, for example, instead of arguing over what 
―meaningful‖ or ―control‖ demands, States will likely debate what constitutes 
―informed decisions,‖ ―sufficient information,‖ or ―proper training.‖  
 
22. Id. 
23. Horowitz & Scharre, supra note 5, at 4. 
24. Article 36, Key Elements, supra note 20, at 1. 
25. ICRC Statement, supra note 13. 
26. Additionally, as Marc Canellas and Rachel Haga point out, significantly more precision 
will be necessary before the standard can be practically applied at the design level. Marc C. 
58 TEMPLE INT‘L & COMP. L.J. [30.1 
Additionally, broader questions remain unresolved. Should control be exercised 
over the entire weapon system, or perhaps only over its ―critical functions‖?  If so, 
what functions are ―critical‖?  Alternatively, perhaps meaningful human control 
must be exercised over individual attacks, regardless of whether an AWS may be 
employed? If so, there are different aspects of an attack, each of which may be 
subject to different degrees of human control, including (1) why someone or 
something is targeted; (2) how force is used; (3) who or what is harmed by the 
attack (both directly and indirectly); (4) when force is applied or harm is 
experienced; and (5) where force is applied and harm is experienced.  
Furthermore, there is still no agreement as to the level of decision-making at which 
human control must occur.  The commander determining the rules of engagement 
is exercising a certain kind of control, the commander ordering a particular attack 
is exercising another, and the individual implementing that order might exercise 
yet another kind of control.  
Given the difficulty in pinning down what ―meaningful human control‖ 
actually requires, ―[s]everal states [have] expressed skepticism over the added 
value of the suggested concept, assessing it as being too vague, subjective and 
unclear.‖  
III.  BENEFITS TO IMPRECISION IN INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY REGULATION 
It may well be, however, that the principle‘s indefiniteness is its strength. 
International law is built on State consensus, and it is often easier to get States to 
first agree to a progressive but vague statement or principle—say, that everyone 
has the right to life —and later hash out what it actually entails, given different 
stances on issues like abortion and capital punishment.  Meaningful human 
 
Canellas & Rachel A. Haga, Toward Meaningful Human Control of Autonomous Weapons 
Systems Through Function Allocation, INSTITUTE OF ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONICS 
ENGINEERS, 6 (2015) (suggesting that ―the effective function allocation literature provides a 
framework for designing rules and standards for AWS‖).  
27. See UNIDIR REPORT, supra note 3, at 2 (questioning whether meaningful human 
control should be exercised over weapons systems, over critical functions of autonomous 
weapons, or over individual attacks).  
28. See ICRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 44 (defining ―critical functions‖ as those relating to 
―selecting and attacking targets‖). 
29. See Horowitz & Scharre, supra note 5, at 15 (raising similar questions); see also Maya 
Brehm, Presentation to the Informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems 
1–2 (Apr. 14, 2015), http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/897D1C5358C307 
BDC1257E280028024B/$file/BREHM_Presentation+on+MHC_14.04.2015.pdf (highlighting 
different aspects of an attack over which human control may be exercised). 
30. Horowitz & Scharre, supra note 5, at 15. 
31. Id. 
32. Biontino Report, supra note 2, at 13; see also id. at 17 (―Meaningful human control may 
be useful as a policy approach to address shortcomings in current technology. However, it should 
not be applied as a legal criterion as this could undermine existing targeting law by introducing 
ambiguity.‖). 
33. Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 3, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948). 
34. Cf. Brian Israel, Treaty Stasis, AJIL UNBOUND (May 8, 2014), 
http://asil.org/blogs/treaty-stasis-agora-end-treaties (―Relatively open-textured treaties that 
  
control, as a phrase, is particularly useful in that it invites commentary and 
interpretation from a wide variety of stakeholders, including State representatives, 
weapon designers and manufacturers, human rights activists, philosophers, and (of 
course) lawyers.  Additionally, flexible terms that simultaneously draw a line 
prohibiting certain extreme developments while allowing for adaptive 
interpretations are of particular use in law intended to regulate new technology, 
especially weapons technologies.  
Take, for example, the two existing and similarly imprecise restrictions on 
new weaponry.  A weapon cannot be ―by nature indiscriminate,‖ which is to say, 
it must be capable of being used in a way that discriminates between lawful targets 
(combatants, civilians directly participating in an attack, and other military 
objectives) and unlawful targets (civilians, civilian objects, and incapacitated or 
surrendering combatants).  Nor can a weapon ―cause superfluous injury or 
unnecessary suffering.‖  Both of these requirements are appealing in the abstract 
 
prescribegeneral principles supply a framework for answering the governance questions that 
inevitably arise over a treaty‘s lifetime with the advent of capabilities and activities not 
expressly addressed by the treaty.‖). 
35. Cf. Article 36, Key Elements, supra note 20, at 2 (noting that any modifier for ―human 
control‖ would be ambiguous, but that ―meaningful‖ is preferable because ―it is general rather 
than context specific (e.g. appropriate), derives from an overarching principle rather [than] being 
outcome driven (e.g. effective, sufficient), and it implies human meaning rather than something 
administrative, technical or bureaucratic‖); UNIDIR REPORT, supra note 3, at 3 (―[‗Meaningful 
human control‘] provides a common language for discussion that is accessible to a broad range of 
governments and publics regardless of their degree of technical knowledge. . . . It focuses on a 
potentially shared objective of maintaining some form of control over all weapon systems . . . . It 
is a concept broad enough to integrate consideration of ethics, human-machine interaction and the 
‗dictates of the public conscience‘ which are often side-lined in approaches that narrowly 
consider technology, law or functions.‖). 
36. Cf. Colin B. Picker, A View from 40,000 Feet: International Law and the Invisible Hand 
of Technology, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 149, 185–86 (2001); Charles J. Dunlap, To Ban New 
Weapons or Regulate Their Use?, JUST SECURITY (Apr. 3, 2015), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/21766/guest-post-ban-weapons-regulate-use/ (arguing for regulating 
weapons‘ effects, rather than weapons themselves). But see Chris Reed, Taking Sides on 
Technology Neutrality, 4 SCRIPT-ED 264, 280 (2007) (questioning the achievability and 
desirability of tech-neutral regulations). 
37. States Parties to the Geneva Conventions developing or acquiring new weapons are 
required ―to determine whether its employment would, in some or all circumstances, be 
prohibited by this Protocol or by any other rule of international law applicable.‖ Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 36, adopted June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter First Additional Protocol]. Many argue that this responsibility is one of 
customary law, as it ―flows logically from the truism that States are prohibited from using illegal 
weapons, means and methods of warfare or from using weapons, means and methods of warfare 
in an illegal manner.‖ Int‘l Comm. of the Red Cross, A Guide to the Legal Review of New 
Weapons, Means and Methods of Warfare: Measures to Implement Article 36 of Additional 
Protocol I of 1977, 88 INT‘L REV. RED CROSS 931, 933 (2006). 
38. See, e.g., First Additional Protocol, supra note 37, art. 51(4); Rule 71. Weapons That 
Are by Nature Indiscriminate, INT‘L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, https://www.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule71 (last visited Aug. 2, 2015). 
39. See, e.g., Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Certain Explosive 
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and clearly prohibit or permit the use of certain weapons at the extremes, but they 
also allow for a fair amount of good faith disagreement about the lawfulness of a 
weapon in the middle ground. For example, when advocates for a ban on anti-
personnel landmines argued that they were already forbidden as inherently 
indiscriminate,  the United States countered that ―smart‖ anti-personnel mines, 
which self-destruct or deactivate automatically, are not per se unlawful.  
Notwithstanding—or perhaps because of—its inherent imprecision, a 
proscription on weapons incapable of being meaningfully controlled might 
usefully join existing prohibitions on new weaponry. While incorporating this 
principle in States‘ legal reviews will not address all of the issues raised by AWS,  
it will help concretize what meaningful human control actually means through 
State practice. However, this principle will only be beneficial if it does not 
undermine existing humanitarian norms governing targeting. 
IV.  AN INTERPRETATIVE FLOOR 
All lawful attacks in an armed conflict must distinguish between lawful and 
unlawful targets (the distinction requirement);  must not cause excess collateral 
damage relative to the anticipated military advantage (the proportionality 
 
Projectiles, adopted Dec. 11, 1868, 18 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 1) 474, 138 Consol. T.S. 
297; First Additional Protocol, supra note 37, art. 35(2); Rule 70. Weapons of a Nature to Cause 
Superfluous Injury or Unnecessary Suffering, INT‘L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, 
http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule70 (last visited Aug. 2, 2015).  
40. See, e.g., Why the Ban, INT‘L CAMPAIGN TO BAN LANDMINES, http://www.icbl.org/en-
gb/problem/why-the-ban.aspx (last visited Aug. 2, 2015).  
41. See Emily Alpert, Why Hasn’t the U.S. Signed an International Ban on Landmines?, 
L.A. TIMES BLOG (Apr. 5, 2012), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world_now/2012/04/mine-
treaty-us-ottawa-convention.html (discussing allusions by U.S. officials that the use of smart land 
mines eliminated potential danger to civilians and therefore had a legitimate battlefield use). 
42. Some have suggested that the meaningful human control principle could solve the AWS 
accountability problem. Cf. Killer Robots and the Concept of Meaningful Human Control, HUM. 
RTS. WATCH & & INT‘L HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC, HARVARD LAW SCH. 6 (2016), 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/supporting_resources/robots_meaningful_human_control_
final.pdf (―An obligation to have meaningful human control would allow for the imposition of 
legal liability and avoid the accountability gap associated with fully autonomous weapons.‖). 
It will not, unless the current international criminal law standard is changed. A human operator 
might make an informed decision, based on sufficient information and training, to deploy a well-
tested and largely predictable AWS—and, due to its capacity for independent and thus sometimes 
unpredictable action, the AWS might nonetheless act in a way that results in a serious violation of 
international humanitarian law without anyone involved acting willfully. At that point, it will be 
possible to identify which person or people were in putative control of the system, but as no 
one—not the deployer, operator, commander, programmer, developer, manufacturer, or the 
weapon system itself—can be held liable under international criminal law absent willful action, 
the accountability gap remains. 
The AWS accountability gap would be best addressed by constructing an international liability 
regime of ―war torts‖ to deter serious violations of international humanitarian law, improve 
formal mechanisms for the recognition of state fault, and provide compensation to victims. 
Rebecca Crootof, War Torts: Accountability for Autonomous Weapons, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1347 
(2016). 
43. First Additional Protocol, supra note 37, art. 48. 
  
requirement);  and must minimize collateral damage and incidental injury (the 
feasible precautions or humanity requirement).  In many situations, meaningful 
human control will usefully augment these humanitarian norms.  The more control 
an operator exercises over a weapon system or attack, for example, the more likely 
she is able to take feasible precautions. This principle is potentially destabilizing, 
however, to the extent it might be interpreted to conflict with existing norms and 
suggest that they could be sacrificed in the name of ensuring additional control. 
Consider the ICRAC‘s definition of meaningful human control, which 
requires the human commander or operator to have ―full contextual and situational 
awareness of the target area‖ and the ―means for the rapid suspension or abortion 
of the attack.‖  If these ―minimum necessary‖ requirements applied to all attacks, 
many weapons that have historically or are currently being employed would be 
rendered unlawful, to the detriment of both soldiers and civilians. As CNAS notes, 
―humans have been employing weapons where they lack perfect, real-time 
situational awareness of the target area since at least the invention of the catapult‖ 
and ―the essence of a projectile weapon, since the first time a human hurled a rock 
in anger, is the inability to suspend and abort the attack after launch.‖  
Additionally, defensive AWS are uniquely effective precisely because they can 
identify, track, target, and engage an incoming threat, possibly before a human 
being even knows of its existence.  In such situations, requiring ―active cognitive 
participation‖ might expose troops to unnecessary levels of risk.  
Not only does the ICARC‘s definition ―articulate an idealized version of 
human control divorced from the reality of warfare,‖  it actually threatens to 
undermine fundamental humanitarian norms governing targeting.  Consider a 
commander deciding between employing a precision-guided munition and a 
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human-piloted bomber to attack a target. In many cases, the former would be far 
preferable for both sides in a conflict. Not only does increased distance between 
troops and a target reduce physical and psychological risk to the side orchestrating 
the attack, the accuracy of precision-guided munitions reduces the need to use 
excessive lethal force when attacking from afar, which in turn lessens the 
likelihood of collateral damage.  Similarly, ―autonomous weapon systems promise 
a next-generation combination of distance, accuracy, and lethality‖—which may 
decrease risks both to the combatants fielding an AWS and to civilians.  These 
potential gains in human safety should not be sacrificed to an overly-strict 
interpretation of what constitutes meaningful human control. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In large part because of its inherent imprecision, the principle of ―meaningful 
human control‖ can fruitfully advance the conversation regarding the appropriate 
regulation of autonomous (and other) weapon systems, especially if it augments 
existing humanitarian norms governing targeting. But these norms—the 
distinction, proportionality, and feasible precaution requirements—should serve as 
an interpretative floor.  Any definition of meaningful human control that would 
prioritize human control at the cost of increased risk to soldiers and civilians must 
be rejected outright. 
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